

THE RISE OF VIOLENCE AND CRIME IN A MULTI-ETHNIC CONTEXT: A SOUTH-AFRICAN CASE STUDY

WILLEM SCHURINK, ANTON SENEKAL & EMMERENTIE OLIPHANT

1. Introduction

Whenever violence and crime occur the social link between people erodes, i.e., society loses its organic unity, integrity or cohesion, becomes more and more atomized and as a result individuals and groups progressively tend to view each other less as human beings and more as objective means to be used to achieve selfish goals. The guiding value where the social link is eroded becomes: "I want what I want when I want it and I'll get it at your cost if need be. Everything and everybody that assists me in this process is good and everything and everybody that obstructs me in this process is bad. Therefore even the use of violence and crime is justified to rid myself of any such obstruction if need be."

The application of physical force to assault, rape, rob, harm, injure and brutally kill citizens has been with mankind since the dawn of history. "Before there were newspapers or radio or television to alert us to its presence, before there were any police and prisons to protect us from those who practice it, violence existed. We know from the Bible that Cain, the firstborn son from Adam and Eve, committed the first recorded murder when he killed his brother, Abel, in a fit of jealousy, and was cursed by God, who set a mark upon him for it. Anthropologists can tell us, from the ancient evidence of human skulls shattered by hand axes, that primitive man destroyed his enemies and his rivals..." (Langone 1984: 3).

Violence has in recent years become foremost concerns of governments globally; particularly former communist countries like the previous Soviet Union and Eastern Block countries have, after the Cold War had ended, experienced increased crime rates (Fattah, 1994). These concerns and the increasing awareness that violence and crime are global problems (note 1)

have certainly reached a climax with the acts of terrorism (note 2) by al-Qaeda (note 3) when they wiped out the World Trade Centre in New York and partially destroyed the Pentagon in Washington in the USA on September 11th, 2001. "Although the effects of globalisation were already apparent at the very beginning of the previous decade (and economists since then have indicated that globalisation would lead to a further widening in the gap between rich and poor), nothing has brought globalisation and its effect so dramatically under our attention as the events of September 11. What happened on that tragic day cannot be isolated from the broader picture. What happened on that day is deeply inscribed in the logic underlying the process of globalisation" (Ngoepe, 2002: 1). This tragic event has not only changed states' views on violence but has resulted in heightened attention in the United States of America and other governments on how to prevent such acts.

In short, violence and crime are complex problems of our globalised contemporary world (note 4). As Muthien (1998) writes: "Violence, from interpersonal violence within the family to large-scale social and political violence, is a complex phenomenon arising from the multiple interaction of a variety of factors."

South Africa has been plagued by crime and violence for many years. However the country has experienced an alarming rise in serious violent in the years leading up to 1994 when it became a truly democracy and while these has been fluctuations in the rates and manifestations of violent crime after this historic event it remains unacceptably high. Consequently few people would disagree that one of the most serious, conspicuous and encompassing social problems that South Africa is presently struggling with is that of violence and crime.

What are the roots/sources/origins of South African violence and crime and what are their impacts on the country? How can the possibility of the scourge of Apartheid being replaced by the scourge of crime (Liebenberg 2003), which seems to be a real possibility in South Africa, be explained? How did the nature of the transition that South Africa shares with other states that moved from authoritarian rule to democracy (cf. the Russian Federation and Latin America) contribute to the current crisis of violent crime in the country? What is the relationship, if any, between South Africa's high crime rates and contemporary

criminality elsewhere? These and other questions are important in appreciating contemporary global violence and crime.

Therefore we offer this chapter as an exploration of violent crime in South Africa, a country in which the rise of social problems of this kind differ in various unique ways from that accompanying major socio-political changes found in other countries during the twentieth century. In short, the Rainbow Nation presents an interesting case study of how various social, economic and political events have contributed to wide-scale violence and crime at the beginning of the 21st century.

It goes without saying that it is impossible to discuss the various historical and socio-political dimensions of violence and crime in South Africa comprehensively as required by a case study analysis. Therefore, we first, contextualize violence and crime in the country, by outlining some key demographics and socio-political developments. Second, we provide a historical sketch of South Africa. Third, we discuss crime and violence in post-apartheid South Africa and discuss some instances of violence manifestations in the country. Finally, we conclude the chapter by briefly sketching the role the family can play in curbing crime and by referring to some measures taken in the country to strengthen the family.

2. South African violent crime: a contextualization

2.1. People and regions

The Republic of South Africa occupies the southernmost part of the African continent and consists of 9 provinces namely the Western Cape, the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Northern Cape, Free State, North-West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and Limpopo (formerly the Northern Province). The country provides a home to a diverse multitude of people with unique cultures, traditions and languages. South Africans belong to one nation, which is a dynamic blend of age-old customs and modern ways. More specifically South Africa is a multi-ethnic country consisting of the following groups: the Nguni people (note 5), who account for two-thirds of the population; the Sotho-Tswana people (note 6), the Tsonga; the Venda; Afrikaners; English; Coloured; Indians, and people who have immigrated to South Africa from the rest of

Africa, Europe and Asia and who maintain a strong cultural identity.

“A wealthy country by continental standards, South Africa is also one of the most unequal societies on earth. By the World Bank’s calculations, the poorest 40 per cent of its citizens earn less than 40 per cent of the income of its citizens earn less than 4 per cent of the income circulating in the economy. The wealthiest 10 per cent pocket more than 51 per cent of income” (Marais, 2001: 7).

These few brief comments on present day South Africa will suffice. We now turn to some key historical developments that shaped the country as well as its violence and crime (note 7).

2.2. South Africa: a historical overview

Various relative comprehensive overviews of South Africa as well as its developments are available (Omer-Cooper, 1994; Keegan 1996; Saunders & Southey 1998; Welsh 1998, Ross 1999; Davenport & Saunders, 2000; Beinart 2001). While all these sources informed us, we borrow in the subsequent brief overview extensively from Marias’ (2001) brilliant critical analysis of the political and social forces that have shaped South African landscape.

- The Bantu and early settlers

The Bantu which were part of a broader African civilisation established themselves approximately 2 000 years ago in the well-watered eastern coastal region of Southern Africa. Bringing with them an Iron Age culture and domesticated crops “...they spread out across the interior plateau, or 'highveld', where they adopted a more extensive cattle-farming culture” (<http://www.gcis.gov.za/docs/publications/yearbook.htm>).

Pioneers of the sea route to India visited the South African coast and in 1652, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) set up a station in Table Bay (Cape Town) to supply provision to passing ships. Beginning in 1657 colonial authorities allotted farms to European settlers in areas surrounding Cape Town. The settlers produced wine and wheat and to produce these products they requested labour. The VOC imported slaves from East Africa, Madagascar and the East Indies for them. By the early 1700s these relatively independent and mobile farmers (trek Boers) started infiltrating the land and water sources. The farmers’

demands for livestock and labour increased giving rise to more and more of the indigenous inhabitants being incorporated into the colonial economy as servants.

The Asian slaves, who were concentrated in towns, formed an artisan class. They brought with them the Islam religion, which gained adherents and significantly shaped the working-class culture of the Western Cape.

In the late 1700s, resistance to colonial encroachment came from Khoisan bands across the length of the colonial frontier. By the 1770s, colonists started to clash with Bantu-speaking chiefdoms. "A century of intermittent warfare ensued during which the colonists gained ascendancy first over the Khoisan and then over the Xhosa-speaking chiefdoms to the east" (<http://www.gcis.gov.za/docs/publications/yearbook.htm>).

- The Zulu kingdom, the British occupation of the Cape, and evangelicalism

In the 1820s the emerging Zulu centralized under its leader, Shaka, established sway over a considerable area of southeast Africa and brought a variety of other chiefdoms under his control. These temporary disruptions of Highveld life facilitated Boer expansion northwards from the 1830s.

The closed and regulated economic system characteristic of the Dutch period was swept away during the beginning of the 1800's when the Cape Colony was integrated into the dynamic international trading empire of industrialising Britain (<http://www.gcis.gov.za/docs/publications/yearbook.htm>).

Convinced that once the shackles of oppression had been removed protestant missionaries believed that indigenous peoples could be fully assimilated into European Christian culture. The missionaries' campaign on behalf of the oppressed Khoisan coincided with sympathy for philanthropic concerns, which resulted in the establishing of Ordinance 50 of 1828. This law guaranteed equal civil rights for 'people of colour' within the colony and freed such people from legal discrimination.

- The "coloured" people, the 1820 British settlers, and the Great Trek

While the compensation money for slaves, which the British treasury paid out, injected unprecedented liquidity late in the 1830's into the local economy, ex-slaves, and Khoisan servants, remained a dispossessed group. Being discriminated against because of their working-class status as well as their racial identity they were increasingly, labelled the "coloured" people. Among the poor, especially in and around Cape Town, there continued to be a great deal of racial mixing and intermarriage throughout the 1800s (http://www.gcis.gov.za/docs/publications/year_book.htm).

Swept up by a scheme to relieve Britain of its unemployed, British settlers were placed in the Eastern Cape frontier zone as a buffer against the Xhosa chiefdoms. Some settlers, who started pressing for the military withdrawal of the chiefdoms, invaded Xhosa land. This in turn led to the Xhosa started raiding as a means of asserting their prior land claims. Consequently racial paranoia became an integral part of white frontier politics resulting in warfare (note 8).

In the mid-1830s the movement responsible for the Boers extending white settlement beyond the Cape's borders to the north, the Great Trek, took place. Several thousand Boers from the interior districts and a number of their Khoisan servants, became alienated by British liberalism, and with their economic enterprise taken over by British settlers, began to migrate to the Highveld and Natal. These *Voortrekkers* came together in two land-locked republics, namely the South African Republic (Transvaal) and the Orange Free State. With limited coercive power, the Boer communities had to establish relations and develop alliances with some black chiefdom in order to neutralise those who obstructed their intrusion or who posed a threat to their security (note 9).

- The colonies

Situated to the south of the Zulu State the Natal colony developed along very different lines from the original colony of settlement, the Cape. Amongst other things, the size of the black population left no room for the assimilationist vision of race domination embraced in the Cape. Consequently, Natal developed a system of political and legal dualism, whereby chiefly rule was well established and customary law was acknowledged (note 10). Natal's economy was boosted by the

development of sugar plantations in the subtropical coastal lowlands. Indian labourers were in demand and were imported from 1860. These Indians, who were segregated and discriminated against from the start, represent another important element in the South Africa population make up.

The Cape Colony was formally non-racial but was based on income and property qualifications resulting in Africans and “coloured” people forming a minority. The so-called “liberal tradition” was important in the Cape since the great mass of Bantu-speaking farmers remained outside its colonial borders until late in the 19th century. In the light of this, non-racialism could be embraced without posing a threat to white supremacy (note 11).

In the Eastern Cape constituencies, political alliances across racial lines were common. When subsequent racial policies violated the ideal and promise of inclusion in the larger society, the Eastern Cape became a seedbed of African nationalism.

- The discovery of natural resources

The discovery of diamonds in the late 1860s drew tens of thousands of people, black and white, to the city of Kimberley. In 1871, the British annexed the diamond fields. This led to the establishment of the Colony of Griqualand West, which was incorporated into the Cape Colony in 1880. The mineral discoveries had a major impact on the African subcontinent and a railway network was built linking the interior to the coastal ports revolutionising transportation and energising agriculture. Coastal cities such as Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London and Durban experienced an economic boom as port facilities were upgraded. “The fact that the mineral discoveries coincided with a new era of imperialism and the scramble for Africa brought imperial power and influence to bear in southern Africa as never before” (www.gcis.gov.za/docs/publications/yearbook.htm).

Independent African chiefdoms were systematically conquered and integrated with their white-ruled neighbours of whom the Zulu War of 1879 presented the most dramatic illustration.

A turning point in the history of South Africa was the discovery in 1886 of the Witwatersrand goldfields since it indicates the emergence of the modern South African industrial State. “Once the extent of the reefs had been established, and deep-level

mining had proved to be a viable investment, it was only a matter of time before Britain and its local representatives again found a pretext for war against the Boer republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State" ([http://www.gcis.gov.za /docs/publications/yearbook.htm](http://www.gcis.gov.za/docs/publications/yearbook.htm)).

In October 1899, the Boer Government was eventually forced into declaring war.

- Demand for African labour

The discovery of diamonds and gold, and other minerals had a radical impact on every sphere of South African society. One consequence was the increasing demand for African labour resulting in many Africans travelling long distances to earn money to supplement their rural enterprises in the homestead economy. "A substantial black peasantry arose, often by means of share-cropping or labour tenantry on white-owned farms. For the white authorities, however, the chief consideration was ensuring a labour supply and undermining black competition on the land. Conquest, land dispossession, taxation and pass laws were designed to force black men off the land and channel them into labour markets, especially to meet the needs of the mines. Gradually, the alternatives available to them were closed, and the decline of the homestead economy made wage labour increasingly essential for survival" (Gov. web site), (note 12).

- The Anglo Boer War and unification

The Anglo Boer War was basically a white man's war. The formal British invasion of the two Boer republics was followed by a prolonged guerrilla campaign. Small, mobile groups of Boers denied the British forces their victory by, amongst others, disrupting rail links and supply lines. Commandos swept deep into colonial territory, stirring rebellion wherever they went. The British responded with a scorched-earth policy, which included farm burnings and looting and the setting-up of concentration camps for non-combatants (note 13).

Government policy in the Union of South Africa developed against the backdrop of black political initiatives. Segregation and Apartheid assumed their shape, in part, as a white response to Africans' increasing participation in the country's economic life and their assertion of political rights. Despite the government's

efforts to hold up traditionalism and to retribalise Africans, they became more fully integrated into the urban and industrial society of 20th-century South Africa than anywhere else on the continent.

- The African National Congress (ANC), the “homelands” and the Natives Act

Founded in 1912, the ANC, drawing together traditional authorities and the educated African elite in common causes, became the most important black organization in the country (note 14).

In keeping with its recommendations, the Union government enacted the decisive Natives Land Act in 1913. This defined the bits and pieces of African ancestral lands after conquest for African occupation, and declared illegal all land purchases or rent tenancy outside these reserves (note 15). The government also regularised the job colour restriction, which reserved skilled work for whites and denied African workers the right to organise. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, entrenched urban segregation and controlled African mobility by means of pass laws (note 16).

- The rise of Afrikaner nationalism

Apartheid foundations being laid by successive governments affected the compromises invented by the National Convention of 1908–1909 contributed to the union of English and Afrikaans-speaking whites. While divisions within the white community remained, Afrikaner nationalism grew to become a force in the years after unification (note 17).

In towns an Afrikaner underclass started emerging, which found itself uncompetitive in the labour market as white workers demanded higher wages than those paid to blacks. This resulted in labour issues being forced onto the agendas of the day.

- Mineworkers' strike and the goldfields rebellion (note 18)

In 1920, some 71 000 black mineworkers went on strike in protest against the spiralling cost of living. Another threat came from white workers. As mine-owners tried to cut costs by using lower-wage black labour in semi-skilled jobs, white labour became

increasingly militant. These tensions culminated in a bloody and dramatic rebellion on the goldfields in 1922, which the Smuts government put down with military force.

- White supremacy and the South African Republic

The commitment to white-labour policies in government employment such as the railways and postal service was intensified, and the job colour bar was reinforced with one of its main objectives to address what was known as a “poor white problem” (note 19).

After the Second World War, in 1948, the NP, with its ideology of Apartheid which advanced an even more rigorous and authoritarian approach than the segregationist policies of previous governments, won the general election. It did so against the background of a revival of mass militancy during the 1940s, after a period of relative calmness in the 1930s when black groups attempted to foster unity among themselves (note 20).

In 1961, the NP government under Prime Minister HF Verwoerd declared South Africa a republic, after having won a whites-only referendum on the issue. A new concern with racial purity was apparent in laws prohibiting interracial sex and in provisions for population registration requiring that every South African be assigned to one discrete racial category or another. For the first time the coloured people, who had always been subjected to informal discrimination, were brought within the ambit of discriminatory laws. In the mid-1950s, the government took the drastic step of overriding an entrenched clause in the 1910 Constitution of the Union so as to be able to remove coloured voters from the common voters' roll. In addition, it enforced residential segregation, confiscating homes where necessary and policing massive forced removals into coloured “group areas”.

Up to the 1940s, South Africa's race policies had not been entirely out of step with those to be found in the colonial world. However, it changed dramatically in the 1950s, when there was a worldwide emphasis on decolonization and a backlash against racism. The architects of Apartheid, among others Dr H.F. Verwoerd, responded by elaborating a theory of multinationalism. This “separate development” policy divided the African population into artificial ethnic “nations”, each with its own “homeland” and each with the prospect of

“independence”. This divide-and-rule strategy was designed to disguise the racial basis of official policymaking by the substitution of the language of ethnicity. This was accompanied by much ethnographic engineering as efforts were made to revive tribal structures (note 21, note 22).

- Rejection of white domination and the bankruptcy of Apartheid

The introduction of Apartheid policies coincided with the adoption by the ANC in 1949 of its Program of Action, expressing the renewed militancy of the 1940s. It embodied a rejection of white domination and a call for action in the form of protests, strikes and demonstrations (note 23).

In March 1960, 69 PAC anti-pass demonstrators were killed in Sharpeville. A state of emergency was imposed, and detention without trial was introduced. The fact that black political organizations were banned, and their leaders either went into exile or were arrested led to the ANC and PAC changing their long-standing commitment from non-violent resistance to armed struggle (note 24).

The 1960s characterized a decade of overwhelming repression and of relative political disarray among blacks inside the country. Armed action from beyond the borders was effectively contained by the State.

The year 1976 marked the beginning of sustained anti-Apartheid revolt. In June, school pupils of Soweto rose up against Apartheid education, followed by youth uprisings all around the country. Youth activism became the single most effective arm of the politics of resistance in the 1980s (note 25). Popular anger was directed against all those who were deemed to be collaborating with the government in the pursuit of its objectives, and the black townships became virtually ungovernable. From the mid-1980s, regional and national states of emergency were enforced.

Internal and external mass resistance continued and it became clear that Botha's strategy of reform initiatives combined with repression had failed to stabilize the internal situation. To outside observers, and also in the eyes of growing numbers of white South Africans, Apartheid stood exposed as morally bankrupt, indefensible and resistant to reforms (note 26).

In 1982, disillusioned hardliners had split from the NP to form the Conservative Party, leaving the NP open to more flexible and modernising influences. After this split, factions within the Afrikaner elite openly started to pronounce in favour of a more inclusive society causing more friction with the NP government, which increasingly became militaristic and authoritarian (note 27). Inside the country, mass action became the order of the day. Petty Apartheid laws and symbols were openly challenged and removed. These developments fuelled with a sliding economy and ever increasing international pressure, gave rise to a number of historic changes.

- Zulu ethnicity and Inkatha, the unbanning of liberation movements and the release of political prisoners

The Inkatha movement, became increasingly oppositional to the externally based liberation movement, and in the 1980s played a straddling role (note 28). The State sought to use Inkatha structures as surrogates in its war against the liberation movement. Eventually battles for turf between Inkatha and the ANC became a very destructive accompaniment to South Africa's transition to democracy.

At the opening of Parliament in February 1990 Mr. FW de Klerk announced the unbanning of the liberation movements and the release of political prisoners, notably Nelson Mandela (note 29).

- South Africa's first democratic election and the ANC's reconstruction and development program

After a long, bumpy negotiation process, marked by much opportunistic violence from the right wing and its surrogates and in some instances sanctioned by elements of the State, South Africa held its first democratic election in April 1994 under an interim Constitution, with the ANC emerging with a 62% majority (note 30).

The ANC-led government embarked on program to promote the reconstruction and development of the country and its institutions. These developments of converting democratic ideals into practice required, first and foremost, a radical overhaul of the machinery of government at virtually every level, which in turn, has lead to a number of milestones.

In conclusion: Incidences of violence and crime in South Africa that have always been part of South Africa, became prominent during the struggle of the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies against the Apartheid regime from 1948 to April 1994 (note 31).

We now turn to a discussion of violence and crime and related socio-political developments in post-Apartheid South Africa in order to reach some understanding of violence and crime in twenty first century South Africa (note 32).

3. Crime and violence in post-apartheid South Africa

3.1. First Approach

With regard to South Africa's transition from Apartheid to democratic rule in 1994, it is fair to assume that all prominent local experts have now come to accept that this radical political transitional process promoted a number of conditions, which have been facilitating the escalation of various criminal phenomena in the country since the major events of 1994. The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) (1996, 20 : 22) illustrate convincingly the acceptance of these "transitional factors" as being important contributing factors towards the existing crime scenario in present day South Africa:

"The shift from the politics of confrontation to the politics of negotiation in order to dismantle legislative Apartheid, was an essential pre-requisite for the reconstruction of the "New South Africa". However, the negotiated transition to democracy and the accompanying unshackling of democratic political process, also had the unintended consequence of breaking down the existing (often illegitimate) mechanisms of social control - without immediately replacing them with legitimate, credible, consensus-based alternatives."

This was directly related to the unique process of negotiated transition in South Africa, which resulted in the new Government of National Unity inheriting (largely intact) all the former government's state institutions - along with much of the existing personnel and institutional culture, as well as a racially based,

disproportionate allocation of criminal justice resources. With this also came an inherited legacy of public mistrust - especially as regards the institutions of the criminal justice system - and a priority concern to transform such inherited government institutions, so as to rebuild public confidence in them.

The undemocratic, unaccountable and largely repressive methods of social control, which resulted in a substantially over-regulated society in the preceding era, were necessarily withdrawn as part of the process of political negotiation after 1990. This process of negotiated transition was extremely efficient in rapidly dismantling these old illegitimate forms of social control - both at the legislative and at an ideological level. However, *the process of consensus-building during the negotiation phase - and even subsequent to the April 1994 election - was considerably less efficient and rather slow in the transformation of inherited state institutions and in the building of legitimate, consensus-based vehicles of social authority, social norms and socialisation processes.*

This 'destruction of social control' served to erode existing perceptions of authority (whether legitimate or not) and rendered the institutions historically responsible for implementing this social control even less effective than had previously been the case. In particular, the state's law enforcement agencies, confronting their own politically-oriented legacy, were largely incapable of maintaining their authority in the absence of repressive controls, or winning public confidence during the transition phase. *The history of resistance to these governmental agencies, their inability to adapt quickly enough to meet the new social demands made of them, coupled with the slow process of negotiating new consensus-based democratic mechanisms, has resulted in high levels of social, political, economic and ideological dislocation within South African society during the transition period. Simply put, this amounts to the piecemeal deconstruction of social control under Apartheid, without the immediate generation of viable alternatives.*

The sluggish pace of transformation of these state institutions and their entrenched organizational culture inherited from the past, is integral to the context in which criminal activity has in some respects become socially accepted, as well as to the creation of an enabling environment because of the relative impunity of criminals which results. *Insufficient skilled personnel, inefficient*

systems, exacerbated historical legitimacy problems, racially skewed allocation of resources, and a serious lack of coordination between departments, all contribute fundamentally to the environment in which criminal activity can flourish. This also impacts significantly on the public psyche as it generates a sense of impunity on the part of criminals, and a sense of helplessness on the part of victims.

As noted, this 'destruction of social control' served to undermine both historically dominant ideological and institutional authority within the society. It also impacted on the material aspirations of people, as competing claims to limited resources within the society became less constrained by the regulatory and repressive mechanisms, which historically had entrenched limitations on people's expectations, social mobility and control over resources. Furthermore, the political transformation process also generated substantial material expectations - rooted in the past politicisation of "bread and butter" issues - much of which were largely beyond the delivery capacity of the new society prior to its substantial reconstruction and the effective transformation of its service delivery institutions.

The period of negotiated transition therefore represents a 'window period' in South Africa's history in which there appears to be a vacuum of legitimate social authority. *When added to the extensive destruction of the family, the school and even the workplace as vehicles of social cohesion during the preceding era, the cumulative experience for many South Africans has been of a society without any cohesive fabric or legitimate sources of authority - perceived by many as a state of "lawlessness". It is clear that this authority vacuum not only provided the space for a free political discourse, but also provided opportunities for the operation, recruitment and organisation of criminal interest groups as well".*

The Nedcor Project (on crime, violence and investment) (1996 : 12) describe what it terms the second set of crime causes as follows:

"The second set of causes of crime in South Africa is related to the political, social and economic transition through which the society is passing. There is overwhelming comparative evidence from other societies in transition (notably Namibia and Russia) that there is a complex relationship between the removal of

previous structures of authority, the inevitable time lag in the creating of new structures, and a period of rising crime rates. Solidarity and community cohesion created by opposition to oppression also served (among other things) to control crime. *Transition, and more specifically the achievement of democracy, has weakened these bonds and allowed crime more space in which to operate. Some of the increase in crime and violence in South Africa over the past 6 years is the unfortunate side-effect of an otherwise positive political, social and economic transition*".

While other countries/states, which recently democratised like the former Soviet Union, have experience an increase in crime (note 33), violence and crime rates in the Rainbow Nation (note 34) have been exceptionally high (note 35). For example, it has even been suggested that the country be "awarded the non-at-war-world country for the highest murder rate!"

Considering existing social science theory, how could the post-1994 phenomenon that crime in South Africa is related to its political, social and economic transition be explained? While many existing constructs could to a greater or lesser extent illuminate this phenomenon, we believe that anomie, provides a pretty good explanation.

The typical consequence of a political transition of this nature and extent, experienced in South Africa could namely be regarded as *transitional anomie* (note 36). Under circumstances like this where the existing normative order does not fully apply anymore but a new normative order is not yet fully operational and in place, unconventional behaviour - which include crime and violence - is often manifested. Many people expressed this reality in informal conversations by saying: "We're in the New South Africa now and can do anything we want to". Although one is surely entitled to derive that the state of anomie is slowly dissipating, one would have to admit that it has not completely disappeared as yet. After 10 years of democracy (celebrated recently, on 27 April 2004 and the third national elections since 1994 held on 14 April 2004) the New South Africa is probably slowly entering a phase where a new normative order is taking shape, being institutionalized and solidifying (in other words, settling into the hearts and minds of South Africans). Optimists would like to believe that South African society has entered a phase where the transitional anomie referred to above, may in time to come be dissipated slowly.

Let's now take a look at some instances of violence manifestation in present-day South Africa.

3.2. Significant examples of current South African crime and violence

A number of books could undoubtedly be written on the wide variety of crimes and violence that found in present-day South African (note 37)¹. Within the confines of a short chapter like this, the best we can do is to introduce a few.

In selecting some pertinent South African crimes we have utilized the well-known social science analytical strategy, namely typology, or “a conceptual framework in which phenomena are classified in terms of characteristics that they have in common with other phenomena” (Mouton & Marais 1990 : 17), (note 38). More specifically, our approach implied: (i) the classification principle used is based on: “To whom is the crime/violence primarily directed?”, (ii) in answering we took the context of the power relation between perpetrator and the individual(s) at which the crime and violence is directed, the victim, as basis, (iii) for us, power not only imply economic and/or political power from the victim's perspective, but also from the perspective of the perpetrator manifested in the ability of the prospective victim to effectively defend or protect him- or herself against possible criminalization, (iv) from this, we argue that crime and violence can, logically speaking, be directed at those higher up in this power hierarchy or – perhaps more likely - at those lower down this hierarchy, or could be directed at those who are perceived to be able to counter the criminal attempt with equal, effective self-protective power (note 39).

Where crime and violence is directed upwardly, a strong element of protest or even rebellion against what is being done or not being done by those in power, can be assumed to form a significant part of the motive for that particular category of crime and violence. Where crime and violence is directed downwards, a strong element of coercive intent in view of the vulnerability or

¹ In fact, quite a number has been produced of which the most prominent ones arguably include: Van der Westhuizen (1982), Schurink, Snyman & Krugel (1992), Glanz, (1993), Glanz & Spiegel (1996), Minnaar & Hough (1997), Bornman, Van Eeden & Wentzel (1998), Emmett & Butchart (2000), Steinberg (2001), Shaw(2002).

weakness of the prospective victim can be supposed to form part of the motive for the particular category of crime and violence. In both cases the real victims of crime and violence may be somebody else than the parties it is directed at. On the preceding basis, we identified two categories or types of crime and violence namely upwardly directed crime and violence and downwardly directed crime and violence (note 40), an example of each from the South African scene to be presented in the remainder of this section.

3.2.1. Upwardly directed crime and violence

Various forms of this kind of crime and violence can be identified. Violence by ex-combatants from both sides of the struggle feeling let down by the new government provides an example. A report by Sasha Gear of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in 2002, *Wishing us away: Challenges facing ex-combatants in the 'new' South Africa (Violence & Transition Series: Volume 8)* is a case in point (note 41). Extreme Right wing violence would also fall into this category. Vigilantism is by implication symbolically directed at government in that it is in effect, in certain cases, implying: "You are not performing your function of protecting us as citizens of this country adequately against crime and are therefore not contributing to a safe and secure environment as you as State are contractually bound to do. We therefore have to fend for ourselves. We will then do so but reluctantly – because this is your duty that we now have to perform. Furthermore, we will do so even outside of the confines of the law if need be". Due to a perceived and/or real failure in performing certain governmental functions, vigilante groups very often step in, albeit illegally, to fill exactly this functional gap.

Perhaps the best-known vigilante groups in South Africa are PAGAD and Mapogo a Mathamaga. In his article on PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs), Le Roux (1997) gives a thorough exploratory exposition of the history and activities of PAGAD within the context of the debate on militant Islamic fundamentalism in SA. He concludes:

"The only way in which the government can deal with PAGAD successfully is to remove the reason for its existence, namely, to reduce the crime wave in the country. Until that comes about PAGAD will remain popular among many South Africans and at the same time a thorn in the side of the authorities for constantly

reminding the world of the new government's inherent weaknesses. PAGAD's willingness to use confrontation to force the state to accept its responsibility as a government elected by the people will no doubt continue to endear the organisation and its leaders to a growing audience in South Africa. There is now a growing perception that the police are quite capable and happy to arrest the members of PAGAD and to raid their homes but that they are less enthusiastic if not seemingly reluctant to mete out the same treatment to gangsters and drug dealers. This is a dangerous perception that the state seems incapable of grasping. As one PAGAD source has pointed out, the government must realise that "the more it curbs us, the more angry and determined we are getting.

There can be no doubt that South Africa has an extraordinary crime situation that needs extraordinary measures by the state to solve such as the introduction of a state of emergency and the reintroduction of the death penalty that was ruled invalid by the constitutional court in 1995. Surveys conducted in 1995 and again in 1996 have shown that more than 93 per cent of South Africa's 40 million plus population favoured a return of the death penalty for serious crimes. The majority of people favoured the introduction of a state of emergency as well as the suspension of some civil rights to counter the nearly 2 million serious crimes that were reported in 1995 and which included 18 983 murders and 66 838 robberies. Despite these horrendous crime figures and the growing calls for the government to adopt an extraordinary approach to the crime situation in the country the ANC government has refused to budge on the issue. No doubt these conditions not only were a major consideration in the formation of PAGAD in 1995, but they have since provided the organisation and its leaders with the necessary justification for their actions."

Although it is being debated intermittingly in South Africa, as elsewhere in the world, whether capital punishment reduces especially serious crimes, at issue is not whether the death penalty really helps to reduce crime levels, but rather that societies/communities need an effective and convincing channel to be found through which an expression of the moral outrage at crime can be made and the message can clearly be conveyed to prospective criminals that crime is not acceptable.

But perhaps the view of the ordinary man was best expressed by Pete Davis, the editor of *The Sunday Tribune*, when he wrote that

the ordinary South African has had enough of crime and violence and unless the authorities do their job of providing law and order the people will ultimately rise. He went on to say that... "we have heard the increasing clamour – the fear behind close doors, the anger over another hijacking in which a friend or a loved one escaped death, the heartbreak when there was no escape from some hardened thug to whom life means as little as a pee in the veld."

In reference to PAGAD, Davis pointed out that the organisation represents a cross-section of people who have been pushed beyond tolerance by terrorising gangs and drug dealers. These same people believe that they have done all in their power to get the police to react to their plight and when nothing happened they were left with little alternative but to take the law into their own hands. He went on to say that since South Africa is part of Africa perhaps the ways of the West are not appropriate here and that the ways of Islam might be better suited to the vicious criminals who would as soon shoot as blink in their quest for a few rands or a vehicle.

These views expressed in August 1996 remain as relevant as ever and will continue to do so until the government gets its priorities right and accept the fact that South Africa needs an extraordinary approach to its extraordinary crime situation. In the meantime, PAGAD and similar organisations will grow from strength to strength and people will be leaving the country in ever-increasing numbers despite controversial claims by the police and the government that there is a decline in the overall crime rate. All this does not bode well for the future of the country and its fledgling democracy".

In an article on whether PAGAD posed a serious threat to the democratic state, Esack (1996:11) concludes: "The problem, however, is the growing alienation that people are experiencing from a liberal democratic state which affords human rights to all, but which is effectively only enjoyed by criminals with their access to ill-gotten money and private armies.

If PAGAD continues to grow, it will not be because of the inherent strength of religious zealotry, but because of the state's inability to fulfil its primary function – to protect the rights of all its citizens."

Once again, whether the human rights culture in South Africa is actually benefiting criminals more than it does law-abiding citizens, is not at issue. The subjective reality is that many if not most South Africans have the perception or belief that this is the case and base their assessment of and reaction to the crime situation in South Africa on these perceptions – even though it may differ from the objective reality. In fact, the frequent use of the term “culture of entitlement” in the media and elsewhere with reference to criminal activities in South Africa, echoes to some extent the sentiments expressed by PAGAD.

The same kind of arguments underlie the origin and development of a similar vigilante group, *Mapogo a Mathamaga* which was formed in August 1996 after the murder of eight businessmen in the Sekhukhune region of the Northern province (Oomen, 1999 : 45). Concluding her discussion on this fast growing, rural based vigilante organization, Oomen remarks: “Mapogo a Mathamaga, it can be concluded, is one of the most important organisations involved in maintaining law and order in the Northern Province. Although its methods are questionable, it is highly popular and – to a certain extent – effective. One of the three factors contributing to this success is the Janus-faced character of the organisation. On the one hand Mapogo is very organised, with a high public profile and an effective PR machine which promotes the notion of an ‘African way of punishing’. On the other, it is capable of hooking onto local disputes and of assuming different identities within different local power struggles. A second contributing factor to the Mapogo success is the state’s dismal failure to protect its citizens. Many Mapogo members joined the organisation after a series of frustrating encounters with the police - which is still considered an alien force instead of a body delivering a service to the community. In contrast to the police, Mapogo does seem to - in many cases - solve cases swiftly and decisively. Thirdly, Mapogo popularity is strengthened by a genuine lack of understanding of features of the criminal justice procedures, especially the prohibition of corporal punishment, the rights of criminals and bail law.

Without acknowledging and dealing with these three factors, the government has little chance of solving problems such as the ‘Mapogo issue’. It is in this context that this article hopes to contribute to the - still very sparse - knowledge of a phenomenon that is not only an indication of the tension and unrest in parts of South Africa but also of what is needed to bring back peace and

stability to the rural areas: an understanding of local dynamics...; an efficient police force and judiciary and a continuing dialogue between government and citizens on the meaning and importance of constitutional values”.

3.2.2. Downwardly directed crime and violence

This category of violence and crime is brought on in situations where perpetrators perceive vulnerability and weakness or lack of self-protective power in the prospective victim. This could include actions ranging from governmental crime and corruption and white-collar, business-related crimes, to blanket abortion on demand (whether legalized by government, performed by a pro-choice doctor or a backstreet abortionist or chosen by a pregnant woman as a means to escape a difficult situation). The latter, though legal, constitutes a moral crime and is directed at the most vulnerable of society's members, i.e. unborn babies. Domestic violence in all its varieties, crimes against minority groups etc. are all examples of downwardly directed crimes. In this section brief reference will be made to domestic violence.

Domestic violence can take many forms. It could manifest as neglect or active abuse and it could manifest on either an emotional/symbolic level or on a physical level. Furthermore it could be directed at any member of the family, especially women, children and the elderly but at husbands and parents as well. In *BEELD* (1 May 2004: 6), a South-African daily newspaper, an article referred to and discussed four cases, since July 2000, where South African teenagers between the ages of 16 and 19 killed either one or both of their parents. The latter examples of family violence could perhaps be classified as both upwardly directed crime (i.e. directed towards authority figures who may have been abusive towards the juveniles) as well as downwardly directed crime (i.e. targeting parents while they were vulnerable and unprepared to protect themselves, e.g. murdering them while they were sleeping). The cases can be summarized as follows:

Murderer	Family members murdered and when	Method used
19 Year old son	Father, mother and brother. July 2000	Shooting victims they were in bed
16 Year old daughter	Father and live-in female partner. Sep-	Setting bedroom ablaze

	tember 2000	
16 Year old daughter and 18 year old boyfriend	Mother. July 2001	Knife
16 Year old son	Mother. April 2004	Knife

Finally, only one example of the physical abuse of children – namely on a sexual level - will briefly be referred to namely that discussed by Sandler & Sepel (in McKendrick & Hoffmann, 1990, 209 : 250). Within families sexual abuse normally takes the form of incest between father and daughter, mother and son, brother and sister, homosexual incest, and finally incest between grandfather and granddaughter.

As far as the extent of incest is concerned, the “tip of the iceberg” argument with reference to statistics strongly applies. (Sandler & Sepel, in: McKendrick & Hoffmann 1990, 217 : 228). Although an increasing number of reports on for instance baby and child rape has appeared in the media recently, it is not always clear whether this is a result of increased reporting or whether it reflects an actual increase in the extent of shield sexual abuse. Suffice it to say that, irrespective of what the statistics (note 42) may say, every single case of child sexual abuse is one too many and should be fought with all means possible.

Various scholars regard South Africa as a country currently enjoying widespread international support. Simultaneously, experts point to the alarming upsurge of violence and crime since the country's successful transition to democracy in April 1994. Ellis (1999 : 49) writes: “South Africa today has no foreign enemies. Its government enjoys overwhelming national and international support. President Nelson Mandela is (sic) probably the world's most admired living politician. And yet the state, in the face of a multiplicity of armed groups, is incapable of enforcing the monopoly of legitimate violence which is its fundamental responsibility.”

Hamber (1998) summarizes South Africa's remarkable transition and some of its consequences as follows: “South Africa's transition to democracy in April 1994 is regarded by many as one of the major achievements of twentieth century. The transformation of the Apartheid state to majority rule has been warmly (and at times cynically) referred to as “a negotiated revolution”, “a miracle transition” and “the birth of a new rainbow nation”. It is

true that South African society has changed. Power has been ushered correctly into the hands of the majority, overt racism has been outlawed, human rights policies entrenched, a constitutional system that can rival any liberal democracy in the world established and there has been limited socio-economic development.

Despite these successes, the long-term impact of the agreements made to ensure peace and reconciliation remain uncertain. A highly politicised population remains trapped in a society of staggering wealth differentials. Those brutally victimised by the security forces have witnessed ruthless killers and their governmental accomplices walk free in exchange for often-meagre confessions. For some victims and survivors of Apartheid, the price of peace has been high".

The rise of crime and the inevitable violence associated with it - as can be seen especially in the rise in aggravated crime - in South Africa, as well as the devastating consequences of this trend on all levels of South African society, are beyond debate. To a growing extent crime and violence are forcing South Africa into survival mode of which violence and crime containment and prevention is but one dimension. Some would even feel that it could even be likened to a low intensity and geographically thinly spread civil war. Small wonder then that various South African government officials as well as local and international scholars have described the escalation of violence and crime in post-Apartheid South Africa as a threat to the 1994 established democracy (Liebenberg 2003, Ellis 1999).

How could this violence threat be managed better if not prevented? This has been a burning question amongst social scientists, law enforcers, the State and the general public for some time now (note 43). While we regard all local attempts at managing the country's unaccepted high occurrence of violence as important, we would now like to highlight some local ideas and practices we regard particularly important. Believing that the family which is certainly more than any other social institution responsible for amongst other things, its socialising function where its members internalize law abiding values, we are convinced that because of this crucial it has to play in society, that this institution should occupy a central role in any attempt to curb violence and crime in South Africa. Therefore we now turn to

local practitioners' and policy makers' views and strategies in this regard.

4. Managing violent crime with special reference to the role of the family

To understand the role of the family in the origin and prevention of violence, it is important to be reminded of importance of the family in society. Following a brief exploration of this relationship, attention will be paid to the connection between the family and crime. In conclusion, attention will be paid to some measures taken in South Africa to strengthen the family.

4.1. The family and how it relates to society and crime

It has often been said and implied that the state of affairs in a society is a reflection the particular society's family life. Sawin (1979:13) writes: "The family is the basic social unit of our human world; it is a microcosm of the larger society... The family setting provides the training ground for learning to live in the larger world." This is not merely an interesting statement, but also a fundamental truth. The Russian experiment in 1917 with its attempted abolishment of the family, the disintegration of social order which resulted in broader Russian society as a consequence of this, and the subsequent re-instatement of the family, attest to the validity of such a claim (Geiger in Bell & Vogel, 1968, 48 : 67). We could therefore reformulate this claim to read: "The family is the incubator of society" or "Society at large is a macro-cosmic outgrowth of the familial micro-cosmic seedbed". This very same relationship between family and society, particularly as it relates to crime and violence, is reflected by Nicholi (1994 : Biblioline Abstract) when he states: "Research data make unmistakably clear a strong relationship between broken families and the drug epidemic, the increase in out-of-wedlock pregnancies, the rise in violent crime and the unprecedented epidemic of suicide among children and adolescents". In South Africa for instance, this strong relationship is reflected in the increasing amount of child-headed families, which is a direct result of HIV/AIDS epidemic in the country. These children who, at an early age become heads of household, often find themselves drawn to crime as a survival strategy.

Family life, therefore, is probably one of the strongest influences in a person's life and as such contributes most strongly to an individual's decision to commit or abstain from crime or violence. Along similar lines one could argue that the family is most probably the best single institution through which the containment of crime could be effected. "Probably the most effective way to prevent crime and delinquency is to support, strengthen and nurture the family and the community as creators of those social bonds that are indispensable for successfully combating crime" (UN, Family Unit 1992: Biblioline Abstract).

Parents obviously play a very important role in the family. For example, many studies underline the fundamental impact that the father has on the behavioural patterns that their children display - also in the negative sense, when fathers present negative examples to their children or simply when they are absent (Farrington & al. 1998; Malpique & al. 1998; Stouthamer & al. 1998; Onatsu & al. 1997; Nicholi 1994). A study by Hughes (1997) on the other hand demonstrated that the positive input by fathers through showing respect and concern towards their sons, facilitated the decision of these sons to turn away from crime and to start showing concern for other juveniles at risk.

While these empirical findings are important indicators one doesn't really need any reassurance of the fact that a solid and happy family life with consistent and loving fathering and mothering is one of the best ways, if not the best, to ensure a stable society with happy and responsible citizens. If one accepts this as a crucial crime preventative role of the family, as well as the fact that the decade long liberation struggle in South Africa and related factors eroded this institution substantially (note 44), the question arises how can the South African family be revitalized to prevent crime and violence in the country?

4.2. Strengthening the family in South Africa

As can be deduced from the foregoing discussion, families are central to the problem of violence and crime not only in South Africa but also, in a very generic sense, in all societies across spatial and temporal boundaries. Not only does crime and violence in the first and final analysis hit family members and families as institutions but to a very large extent and in a very real sense crime and violence also originate within families.

Families can, as has been argued, be strong units in society, acting, to a very large extent as the institutional cornerstones of societies in conveying crucial values and strengthening relationships, thus enhancing the normative and social cohesion of that particular society. To this ideal however, families need all the support available. Following are a number of measures taken in the South African context in support of the family:

- Legislation regarding crime (White Paper on Social Welfare, Acts and work protocols towards domestic violence and sexual abuse prevention)

South-African society is characterised by violent behaviour in various social systems. Violence against women, dependent children, people with disabilities and the elderly is also predominant. According to the White Paper on Social Welfare (1997: 83) crime in South Africa is a “serious impediment to sustained harmonious development”. The need for child and youth care outside of the family context for instance, is on the increase. In fact substitute care as result of domestic violence or sexual abuse is a major problem in the social welfare system in South Africa. This indicates that a growing number of children and youths are driven out of their families of orientation as victims of violent crimes. Sadly, in many cases, the offender is also part of the very nuclear or extended family from which young people are escaping.

Sexual abuse, physical abuse, rape and neglect are just some of the crimes against children, leading to the institutionalisation of these children.

Social workers at local child welfare agencies report an increase of sexual abuse, family violence and rape. Emotional abuse, as part of other forms of domestic violence, is also on the increase, but extremely difficult to assess and subsequently to prove. Emotional abuse as such however, is one of the very important factors directly related to family disintegration. In fact the increase of family violence has been so severe that legislative measures had to be put in place to address the problem. *The Domestic Violence Act (116/1998)* and *White Paper on Social Welfare (1997)* are both measures put in place to prevent violent crimes within families.

- Preventing violence

Prevention of violence is not only in the hands of authorities in South Africa but also in responsibility of the community. The White Paper on Social Welfare (1997) again identifies the different strategies, which can be used to address and alleviate crime. The approach that is used is that of a holistic perspective providing integration of various governmental departments with the opportunity to work together. Crime prevention, restorative justice and victim empowerment is seen as broad strategies that need to be taken into consideration when attempting to address crime and specifically to break the repetitive cycle of crime and violence. Unless this repetitiveness is broken, prevention services cannot claim to be successful in this regard.

Prevention programs are specifically aimed at strengthening families and preserving the essence of the family. The re-integration of offenders not only into families but also into the community, are seen as one of the major prevention strategies in combating the cycle of crime and violence in the country. Such re-integration implies on the one hand that families should be carefully prepared for the return of the offender. It also suggests that employment should be available to offenders. Besides employment programs, policies also suggest skills training and retraining opportunities for ex-offenders as well as halfway houses and community based temporary shelter programs.

Programmes such as victim empowerment enable the victim or survivor to become stronger and enhances his or her ability to prevent ongoing victimisation. Victim empowerment puts the emphasis on the victim's role in survival rather than becoming a victim of the repetitive cycle.

Restorative justice on the other hand, is put in place to prevent a repetition of the cycle of violence and crime in the community. It implies that victim's perspectives are taken into consideration and are implemented in the community by means of specific justice processes, through which social cohesion is promoted. Restorative justice places the victim in the centre of the decision making process of offender sentencing. Through this, the community is given power in decision making when offenders are sentenced. Community members feel that they play an important role in prevention and breaking the repetitive violent cycle. Local policymakers are of the opinion that the

reconstruction of social cohesion will bring about a decrease in violence and crime.

Strong emphasis is placed on the re-integration of offenders in the community after the completion of their correctional services. This however remains an ideal in light of the local lack of services, which is currently available to offenders. Another challenge is to overcome the cycle of crime and violence due to the unfortunate present situation that services; employment opportunities and other support are despite policy, often not readily available.

Community sentencing is considered as the option before institutionalisation and as a last resort, which should only be utilized for offenders regarding a threat to society. Finally, crimes of violence regardless of whether it is against the family or directed at the community should be considered a crime threatening the safety of the community. It is recognized that community sentencing is often not the ideal where the offender is sentenced for a violent or sexual crime.

5. Conclusion

This case study of crime and violence in multi-ethnic South African society offers a brief overview of this multiracial national state, which has for many decades been a troubled torn country. Occurring primarily along race and ethnic lines this strife has been fuelled by political considerations, which to a very large degree have shaped the persistent wave of violence and crime the country has been experiencing for quite some time now.

In spite of the 1994 miracle, when power was transferred peacefully to a democratically elected black majority government in South Africa, a new threat, in the form of crime and crime-related violence, which the Government thus far could not contain successfully, made its presence felt in no uncertain terms. However, while violent crime remain high in the country there is some optimism since although a racial/ethnic element is still very prominent in certain crimes like murders perpetrated against white farmers (note 45), there is a tendency of violent incidents of late being colour-blind. At the same time, however there is the disturbing tendency among certain

communities and groups in the country to take the law into their own hands, as they perceive the Government being unable to protect South African citizens adequately. This is a serious development which if not addressed speedily and effectively could in the long run become highly politicised issue.

We concluded with emphasising the family as key institution in South African society and indicating its crucial role in any long-term attempt to address the Rainbow Nation's crime and violence problem.

6. Notes

1 Since the tragic event of September 11th, there has been "...a stark awareness that the USA is inextricably embedded in a larger, more complex, and much more dangerous world that most Americans thought. The horrible events of 9/11, broadcast live to this country and the world, were shocking and incomprehensible to many people...But what is clear is that the foreign nationals who hijacked and piloted jet airliners into buildings in Washington and New York, raining death and destruction onto those cities, graphically and violently illustrated that global forces can impact people here in the United States... But it is undeniable that it (9/11/01) has changed the way that people here in the U.S. perceive the world and our place in it. While currently there are many distinct 'analyses' of these events, many based on prejudices rather than fact or logic, there is an enormous interest in reassessing our relationships with various peoples and societies around the globe...There is a heightened appreciation that the sort of things we associate with 'globalization' are more than mere abstractions and are relevant to everyday life. Sociologists and other social scientists now must try to unravel the complexities, debunk the misconceptions, and provide coherent explanatory frameworks for understanding how global forces generate a wide array of new problems and possibilities" (Smith 2001, 429: 430).

2 "Terrorism is a particularly troubling form of assault often directed against innocents. Terrorism is the use of violence or the threat of violence as a means of combat or to achieve some strategic goal by striking fear in victims through ruthless actions " (Peterson, Wunder & Mueller 1999: 384).

3 Many people around the world who lost dear ones during these attacks are still trying to make sense of this tragedy. See for example, Ellis (2002).

4 Since capitalism is now widely regarded as the singular global economic system, it seems reasonable to suggest, as scholars has

recently tended to do, to investigate the possible links between political violence and capitalism (Besteman 2002).

5 That is the Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele and Swazi.

6 That is the Southern, Northern and Western Sotho.

7 Many if not most social science accounts of crime and violence in South Africa focus on Apartheid and democratic post-Apartheid South Africa. While these focal points are certainly important in unraveling some of the diverse manifestations of violent crime in the country and shed valuable light on the complexity of its causes, these accounts overlook important social, structural and political-economic dynamics of early periods in the history that shape South African society and its social ills of violence and crime (Marais 2001).

8 This became endemic through much of the 19th century.

9 After the mineral discoveries of the late 1800s the balance of power swung decisively towards the colonists. The Boer republics then took on the paraphernalia of real statehood and imposed their authority within the territorial borders that they had claimed for themselves.

10 This system is widely regarded as having provided a model for the segregation policy of the 20th century.

11 Numbers of Africans within the Cape colony had had sufficient formal education or owned enough property to qualify for the franchise.

12 Africans were denied basic rights since the illusion could be maintained that they did not belong in 'white South Africa' but in stead to 'tribal societies' from which they came to service the 'white man's needs', and local authorities confined black families to segregated 'locations' where they secured a foothold in the urban areas.

13 Some 26 000 Boer women and children died from disease in these camps. Africans and "coloureds" too suffered from appalling conditions and at least 14 000 are estimated to have died.

14 While the organization, in its early years, was concerned mainly with constitutional protest, worker militancy emerged in the wake of the First World War, and continued through the 1920s.

15 The 'homelands' eventually comprised about 13% of South Africa's land surface and administrative and legal dualism reinforced the division between white citizen and black non-citizen.

16 These laws were intended to trap Africans in a web of coercion designed to force them into labour, to keep them there under conditions and at wage levels that suited white employers, and to deny them any bargaining power.

17 It was given impetus in 1914 when (i) a group forming the National Party (NP), broke away from the ruling South African Party, and by (ii) rebellion of Afrikaners who could not accept the decision, to join the First World War against Germany. In part, the NP spoke for Afrikaners that were impoverished by the Anglo-Boer/South African War and removed from the land by the development of capitalist farming.

18 A subsequent mineworkers' strike was of course the one of 1946, which was a turning point in the emergence of politics of mass

mobilization as was the case with the First World War, the experience of the Second World War and post-war economic difficulties that enhanced dissatisfaction.

19 In 1936, white supremacy was further entrenched by the United Party with the removal from the common voters' roll of the Africans of the Cape Province who qualified. The change was marked by the formation of the ANC Youth League in 1943, fostering the leadership of amongst others Nelson Mandela, who were to inspire the struggle for decades to come.

20 The change was marked by the formation of the ANC Youth League in 1943, fostering the leadership of amongst others Nelson Mandela, who were to inspire the struggle for decades to come.

21 The process involved the repression of opposition and the use by the government of the power to nominate and thereby protect elected assemblies with a quota of compliant figures.

23 Forced removals from 'white' areas affected some 3,5 million people, and vast rural slums were created in the homelands. The pass laws and influx control were extended and harshly enforced, and labour bureaux were set up to channel labour to where it was needed. Industrial decentralisation to growth points on the borders of the homelands was promoted as a means of keeping blacks out of 'white' South Africa.

24 The Defiance Campaign of the early 1950s carried mass mobilization to new heights under the banner of non-violent resistance to the pass laws.

25 In 1963 top black politician leaders still inside the country, including members of the newly formed military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), were arrested At the 'Rivonia trial', Mandela, and others convicted of sabotage were sentenced to life imprisonment.

26 Another important development in the nineteen seventies, namely the involvement of workers in resistance took on a new dimension with the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the National Council of Trade Unions.

27 The collapse of global communism, the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban support for the MPLA regime in Angola, and the negotiated independence of Namibia –formerly South-West Africa, administered by South Africa as a League of Nations mandate since 1919 – did much to change the mindset of whites. For example, (i) Afrikaner nationalism had lost much of its *raison d'être*, (ii) many Afrikaners had become urban, middle class and relatively prosperous, (iii) Afrikaners' ethnic grievances, and attachment to ethnic symbols, had largely waned, (iv) a large part of the NP's core constituency became willing to explore larger national identities, even across racial divides, and (v) white South Africans sought international respectability.

28 A number of business, student and academic Afrikaners held meetings publicly and privately with the ANC in exile. Secret talks were held between the imprisoned Nelson Mandela and government

Ministers about a new dispensation for South Africa with blacks forming a major part of it.

29 Stressing Zulu ethnicity and traditionalism, Inkatha claimed mass following in the rural areas of the KwaZulu homeland. Its leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, carved a distinctive niche for himself, refusing 'independence' for KwaZulu but squeezing patronage from the Apartheid State by casting Inkatha in the role of loyal opposition.

30 International financial, trade, sport and cultural sanctions were called for in a co-coordinated strategy by the internal and external anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa. At this point, the ANC, enjoying wide recognition as the foremost liberation organization, was increasingly regarded as a government in waiting.

31 The ANC's main opposition came from the NP, which gained 20% of the vote nationally, and majority in the Western Cape where it was strongly supported by colored voters. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) received 10% of the vote, mainly in its KwaZulu-Natal base.

32 Important works dealing with covert operations, political violence, assassinations of politicians and related violence and victimization are: Minnaar, Liebenberg and Schutte (1994), and Schutte, Liebenberg and Minnaar (1998).

33 Again, we borrow extensively from prominent scholars' work on violence and crime in democratic South Africa.

34 Gordon (2001:59) writes:" a high level of serious crime—particularly organized crime—is a common feature of new democracies. Liberation includes license, and countries from Russia to South Africa are coping with the consequences."

35 According to Palmberg (1999: 17) "Rainbow nation" was introduced as a metaphor for the new South Africa by Desmond Tutu, the then Archbishop of the Anglican church, and used by President Nelson Mandela in his inauguration speech in May 1994. "On a general level the metaphor is a beautiful symbol for a new attitude towards the various groups making up South Africa, each welcome to add colour to a multiethnic country."

36 A brief overview of international crime statistics on the Interpol Web site indicates that South Africa's relative position to that of other countries from 1996 and upwards is not only the highest, but is also steadily increasing from its already high levels. According to The Crime Information Management Centre (1998) the country's murder rate was in 1997 about eight times as high as that of the USA, and rape and robbery were more common, with carjacking scourge in many white and black communities (Gordon, 2001).

37 Anomie is a well-known tradition within the macro-normative deviancy approach (Orcutt, 1983). While a number of sociologists contributed to this tradition, we refer here to Durkheim's (1951) classic approach that centers on the impact of cultural and structural change on the level of criminal behaviour. Somewhat related to our usage of anomie is that of Messer and Rosenfeld (1994 & 1997).

38 In fact, quite a number has been produced of which the most prominent ones arguably include: Van der Westhuizen (1982), Schurink, Snyman and Krugel (1992), Glanz, (1993), Glanz and Spiegel (1996), Minnaar and Hough (1997), Bornman, Van Eeden and Wentzel (1998), Emmett and Butchart (2000), Steinberg (2001), and Shaw (2002).

39 Though obviously a risky undertaking, crime typologies have been used fruitfully in criminology and other disciplines in the social sciences providing a framework for data collection and analysis. Constructing typologies similar to those of Schwabe and Schurink (2000) could be helpful in understanding South African crime and could, in turn, provide building blocks for controlling if not preventing it.

40 It goes without saying that possession of this kind of power in all likelihood correlates with the possession of socio-economic or socio-political power in society.

41 It should not be assumed that these categories are necessarily either exhaustive or mutually exclusive.

42 Also see Liebenberg & Roefs (2001).

43 The Crime Information Analysis Centre of the South African Police Service (SAPS) tries to present a statistical picture of crime in South Africa but is of course also subject to data based on reported incidents. Unreported cases will go unnoticed. Their website can be traced via that of the SAPS <http://www.saps.org.za>.

44 A great many social scientists over the last hundred years or so have devoted substantial time and energy in attempts to understand and curb violence and crime. A study of the relevant literature should, amongst others, lead to the following conclusions: *First*, divergent disciplines and traditions have contributed to the study of violence and crime, which have often evoked controversies and heated debates. *Second*, violence and crime are culturally molded. What is legal and desirable in one culture may be viewed as a serious crime in another; even within a single culture, the definition of crime and violence may change through space and time (Stephens 1994). *Third*, the relationship between violence, crime, power, and politics has been found to be diverse and complex. *Fourth*, scholars have conceptualized violence and crime differently. Most notably two contrasting conceptions developed. These are: the *objectivist* and the *subjectivist* conceptions (Pfuhl 1980; Orcutt 1983, Ward, Carter & Perrin 1994). The former focuses on why people engage in norm-violating behaviour. Its theoretical concepts assume that human behaviour is to a greater or lesser extent determined. In contrast, the latter emphasizes that violence/crime is a socially constructed phenomenon and its symbolic tools assume that human beings are capable of at least some degree of free will when considering committing crime. *Fifth*, while numerous studies using different research designs have been launched by scholars studying violence and crime over the years, two basic levels of analysis - *macro* (e.g. large-scale structural and cultural structures/forces) versus *micro* (e.g. interaction processes at the individual level) - have been employed in such research. *Sixth*, scholars have demonstrated that

intervention in violent and criminal acts is a very complex, if not controversial, process necessitating multiple approaches, strategies and actors. *Finally*, social scientists have differed sharply on appropriate social policies to manage, if not prevent, specific types of violence and crime.

45 Marriage and family life in South Africa: Research priorities (1997) points out that (i) South African society has been subjected to far-reaching changes which, especially since the Second World War, have caused mounting tensions in the family life of its various ethnical groups, resulting in the family itself becoming increasingly vulnerable, and (ii) there has been an increase in family breakdown in the country with widespread negative consequences for the country and its citizens.

46 See Schönteich (2000), Moolman (2000).

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